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I. Introduction
Gaining access to content is critically important for entrance into the
television industry; this is a necessary input to become a viable competitor
against incumbent video industry players.' However, incumbents have the
ability and incentive to withhold programming that discourages potential
competitors from entering the market. Entrants, built up over a long period
of time, confront a symbiotic relationship between traditional content
providers and incumbent content distributors. For instance, content
distributors possess the incentive and ability to leverage programming
relationships to preserve existing business models to disadvantage over-
the-top internet competitors that the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") has identified as online video distributors ("OVDs"). 2 Since
* Professor of Economics, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville.
1. For examples of specific actions taken by incumbents to stop the growth of online video,
see Marvin Ammori, Copyright's Latest Communications Policy: Content-Lock-Out and
Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 375, 379 (2010)
("[T]he incumbent [Multichannel Video Program Distributors ("MVPDs")] and programmers
have engaged in a series of practices to undermine the competitive threat of online video.").
2. According to the FCC, OVD is defined as:
[A]n entity engaged in the business of making available, for free or for a
charge, professional video programming delivered over the Internet to end
users, through any means of online delivery including, but not limited to, a
website, an online or mobile wireless portal, or an aggregator or syndicator of
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OVDs started to offer video online in the mid-2000s, incumbents have
stressed the threat they pose to the traditional, highly profitable way the
industry conducts business. For example, the attitude of existing video
distributors toward the nascent rivals is typified by Time Warner Cable.
The leading cable operator's Chief Operating Officer Landel Hobbs's
comment, "[w]e have to be very careful of stuff like over the top or all
video content over the top on the Internet. There is a dual revenue stream
that we have to be careful of. Surviving on just advertising is a very tough
thing."4 Instead, the "stuff' referenced by Mr. Hobbs, although a threat to
incumbents in the industry, holds the promise of increasing competition
throughout the television industry, leading to increased consumer choice
regarding when, where, and on what device to watch video.
There are two main ways for video content distribution incumbents to
entrench their power and suppress new competition. First, viewers need
access to high-speed broadband lines in the last mile (i.e., local loop) in
order to have a viewing experience comparable to that provided by
traditional video distributors.5 High-speed broadband is most frequently
provided using a cable modem service owned by cable operators (with
limited competition from telephone providers, especially in parts of the
nation where fiber-optic cable is deeply deployed into the last mile).6 In
2010, the FCC implemented openness rules for the last mile, in part to
facilitate the growth of OVDs.7 Despite these FCC rules, incumbents
(distributors and programmers) pose a second and more important hurdle to
professional video programming such as Apple Company's iTunes, Comcast's
FanCast Xfinity, Netflix, and Hulu.
See Information and Discovery Request for NBC Universal, Inc., FCC 15 (2010), http://hraunfo
ss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-298335A2.pdf. An OVD's geographic market covers all
regions of the nation capable of receiving high-speed internet access service. Id. The definition
excludes incumbent video distributors that provide access to content online within existing
geographic areas in which they own physical distribution facilities. Id.
3. Marvin Ammori, TV Competition Nowhere: How the Cable Industry Is Colluding to Kill
Online TV, FREE PRESS 12 (Jan. 2010), http://www.freepress.net/sites default/files/fp-legacy/TV-
Nowhere.pdf.
4. Steve Donohue, Time Warner Cable COO Rips "Over-the-Top Services,"
CONTENTINOPLE (2009).
5. Adam B. VanWagner, Seeking a Clearer Picture: Assessing the Appropriate Regulatory
Framework for Broadband Video Distribution, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2909, 2914 (2011).
6. Id. at 2915.
7. Two of these rules, anti-blocking and antidiscrimination, were vacated by the D.C.
Circuit in January 2014 because they imposed per se common carriage obligations on broadband
service providers although they were not classified by the FCC as common carriers. On the
positive side for the FCC, the Court determined that the Commission had positive authority to
enact measures encouraging the deployment of broadband infrastructure. Verizon v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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emerging competitors; they can use their terms and conditions to make
access to video content difficult.
In order to explore the avenues available to distribution competitors to
gain access to content, the traditional business model, sorted into four
major components, for incumbent multichannel video programming
distributors ("MVPDs") is explained in Part II. Challenges to the specific
components of the business model are examined in Part III. Challenges are
analyzed for three main stakeholders: Cable programmers, broadcast
programmers, and multichannel video programming distributors. In this
part, legal and economic issues involving the demand for access to
unbundled networks, new technologies for viewers to watch video, and
cases involving regulatory opportunities to increase access to network
programming, are examined. Part IV provides a brief conclusion.
11. Traditional Business Model of Pay-TV Providers
Four distinct stages of production characterize the path of video
programming to the home:
i. Creation of video programming (this includes film studios and
sports leagues, as well as TV and cable production facilities).
ii. Compilation of video programming into individual broadcast and
cable networks (such as ABC, CBS, NBC, Comedy Central, USA,
HBO, and Showtime).9 Individual networks that dominate viewing
hours are generally under the control of one of six giant
programmers: NBC Universal (now owned by Comcast), Viacom
(which owns Comedy Central, Nickolodeon, and the MTV
networks), The Walt Disney Company (which owns ABC and
ESPN), News Corp. (which governs all Fox programming,
including FX and Fox), Time Warner, Inc. (which includes Warner
Bros. and CNN), and CBS Corp.10
iii. Aggregation of various networks owned by programmers and
subsequent distribution of the aggregated/packaged video
programming by MVPDs (cable companies [such as Comcast,
Time Warner Cable, and Cablevision], satellite companies [Dish
Network, and DirecTV Group], and telephone companies [such as
AT&T and Verizon]) to pay-TV subscribers." MVPDs generally
8. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR THE
DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING, FCC 13-19 (2013), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/ attachmatch/FCC- 1 3-99Al.pdf [hereinafter Annual Assessment].
9. Id. at 160-74.
10. See generally Ashley Lutz, These 6 Corporations Control 90% of the Media in America,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 14, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-
control-90-of-the-media-in-america-2012-6 for an infographic on mass media conglomerates.
11. Annual Assessment, supra note 8, at 174-76.
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require viewers to use set-top boxes to access the network
programming they have paid to access.12
iv. Physical infrastructure (coaxial cable, copper wire, and satellites)
that serves as transmission vehicles to deliver content to the
residences of pay-TV subscribers.' 3
There is a varying amount of competition at each stage of production
(horizontal competition) and among major cable MVPDs that own both
video distribution facilities and sets of cable networks (vertical integration).
Traditional MVPDs operate as integrated providers of stages (iii) and (iv).14
The specific means of distribution vary with the type of video provider. 5
Cable operators provide a multichannel video service over a coaxial cable
infrastructure (today, a hybrid of coaxial cable and fiber-optic cable).' 6
Satellite operators provision their service by use of satellites and home
receiver devices.'7  Telephone companies provide video services using
copper wire lines, copper wire/fiber-optic cable, or exclusively fiber-optic
cable infrastructure.' 8
With innovations in broadband and digital technologies becoming
widespread in the 1990s, it is now possible to separate/unbundle stage (iii)
from stage (iv).19 This enables the physical means of distribution to
become a separate, independent product market from the programming
content distributed.2 0 That is, as a result of the convergence of formerly
single purpose communications media, video programming can be
transported over the Internet (by wireline or wireless connections) to
viewers by use of a high-speed broadband connection. 2 1 This integration
facilitates independence of services (such as video and voice) from the
physical transmission network.
A second aspect of vertical integration that has been a focus of
governmental authorities is the ownership of must see programming
networks by vertically integrated MVPDs.2 2 The concern today, discussed
in Part III, manifests in the ownership of highly demanded regional sports
12. Id. at 177.
13. Id. at 44-56.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 45.
17. Id. at 51.
18. Id. at 55.
19. Id. at 39-40.
20. Id. at 40.
21. Id. at 43.
22. Id. at 81-82.
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networks ("RSNs") by cable operators, such as Comcast and Time Warner
Cable.23
Components of the traditional business model for pay-TV distributors
are as follows:
i. Cable networks are sold by a programmer in a bundle that
frequently combines high demand and low-demand networks to
MVPDs.24 A cable network has two main sources of revenue.
One, a video distributor pays the cable network a monthly per
subscriber fee based on the number of subscribers that can access
the network.2 5 Two, a cable network also generates revenue from
selling advertising slots associated with the programming of the
network (it often shares some of the advertising revenue with the
video distributor). A video distributor usually decides in which
tier of service the network will be located.27 A video distributor
determines in which neighborhood of networks (e.g., sports
networks, news networks) to position the network.28 In the
confidential contract between a video distributor and a cable
network (or its programming representative), there may be a
provision that prohibits the network and/or its specific
programming from being sold to an online distributor, or
discourages such a sale by including financial incentives. 29 A most
favored nation clause may be included, stating that if the network
provides a lower fee to another video distributor, that lower fee
will be applied to the video distributor in question.30
ii. MVPDs are either subject to a must carry rule for a local broadcast
network (with no payment for the signal required), or, if elected by
a local broadcast network, engage in retransmission consent
negotiations to determine the terms of the distribution agreement
23. Id. at 171.
24. For example, according to a complaint by Cablevision, Viacom, one of six powerful
programmers, sells a bundle of eight high demand (core networks) with fourteen low-demand
networks (otherwise known as "suite networks"). See Amended Complaint, Cablevision Sys. Corp.
et al. v. Viacom Int'l Inc. et al., 2013 No. 13 CIV 1278 (LTS) (JLC) WL 4828947 (S.D.N.Y. July
16, 2013) [hereinafter Cablevision Complaint]. According to Cablevision, it will not sell access to,
in lieu of a huge penalty, the core networks separately from the suite networks. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Annual Assessment, supra note 8, at 46.
28. Id. at 51-55.
29. Brian Stelter, Gatekeepers of Cable TV Try to Stop Intel, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/business/media/gatekeepers-of-cable-tv-try-to-stop-intel.html.
30. Video Marketplace Competition Is Evolving, and Government Reporting Should Be
Reevaluated, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 19 (June 2013), http://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-13-576.
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for permission to transmit the broadcaster's signal.31  Historically,
commercial broadcast networks relied predominantly on
advertising revenue generated by time slots inserted before, during,
and after scheduled programs that were sold to advertisers. 32 More
recently, retransmission fees have become an increasing source of
revenue for broadcast networks. These are similar to the fees
paid to cable networks because they involve a per subscriber
monthly payment. A MVPD must either pay the local broadcaster
or forgo the distribution of that local broadcaster's signal.34
MVPDs are not allowed to import a distant broadcast signal
offering comparable network programming into a local station's
geographic coverage area.
iii. To a large extent, MVPDs control what networks they provide,
establish the different tiers of service, and the price of each tier
where a tier represents a bundle/package of networks available to
the subscriber. MVPDs generate revenue through monthly
subscription charges and advertising.3 s For example, an MVPD
offers various tiers of service starting with basic cable service,
which includes local commercial and noncommercial broadcast
networks and public, educational, and governmental channels.
Expanded basic service adds to basic service access to a large
bundle of cable networks. Also, a viewer can add to the basic
and expanded basic packages by selecting premium networks such
31. Annual Assessment, supra note 8, at 104-05.
32. See id. at 74-75 and accompanying footnotes.
33. For instance, total retransmission consent fees paid to broadcasters (according to media
analytics company SNL Kagan) totaled $210 million in 2006, $310 million in 2007, $500 million in
2008, $760 million in 2009, $1.24 billion in 2010, $1.76 billion in 2011, $2.36 billion in 2012, and
$3.02 billion in 2013. Richard Greenfield, The Disequilibrium of Power: How Retransmission
Consent Went So Wrong, and How to Fix It, ALL THINGS D, (Aug. 27, 2013), http://allthingsd.com
/20130827/the-disequilibrium-of-power-how-retransmission-consent-went-so-wrong-and-how-to-
fix-it/. These fees are projected to reach $6 billion by 2018. SNL Kagan Updates Retransmission
Fee Projections to $6B by 2018, PR WEB (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/11/
prwebl0088524.htm.
34. See Karl Bode, 2013 Had Most Retransmission TV Blackouts on Record, DSL
REPORTS (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/2013-Had-the-Most-Retransmi
ssion-Tv-Blackouts-on-Record-127277. Retransmission disputes resulting in some period of time
where the broadcast network was blacked out to the MVPD's viewers reached a record level
(127) in 2013. Id. In 2012, there were ninety-one, in 2011, there were fifty-one, and, in 2010,
there were twelve. Id.
35. There is a small percentage of revenue generated by pay-per-view opportunities
presented to pay-TV subscribers. See David Waterman & Sangyong, Broadcasters vs. MVPDs:
Economic Effects of Digital Transition on Television Program Supply (Aug. 2009),
http://www.indiana.edul-telecom/people/faculty/waterman/Broadcastersvsmvpds-DW.pdf.
36. Annual Assessment, supra note 8, at 46.
37. Id.
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as movie networks and specialized sports networks.
Traditionally, the programming on each network is offered at a
scheduled time (called linear programming) with no input from
viewers. Significantly, the invention of the video cassette
recorder in the 1970s and a subsequent Supreme Court decision40
(the 1984 Betamax ruling in which the Court permitted use [since
the action was deemed legitimate fair use] of a recording device to
time-shift viewing) allowed viewers to record programs in their
homes and watch them on their own time.4 1 Recording of
programs also enables, to the great fear of advertisers and the
television industry in general, the viewer to unbundle (by skipping)
the ads from the program content. The technological innovation
and accompanying legal decision were a first step in giving a
viewer control over his/her video experience.
iv. An important part of the business model is the regularly scheduled
presentation of the programs on a network. Typically, popular
shows are broadcast on a network once a week, with twenty-two
new episodes of the show airing over the course of a season and the
network may rerun the episodes of the prior season before starting
the next season.42 The television and movie industries make wide
use of a windowing process that tries to segment the viewing
audience based on a willingness to pay theory that is related to the
proximity to the first airing of the content.43 Normally, the longer a
video distributor is willing to wait to sell the content (such as an
episode of a show), the lower the content price." In addition to
scheduled programming, and in response to consumer demand,
MVPDs are airing more of the programming using an "on-
demand" model. In this model, the video operator stores past
episodes (of the current season and/or prior seasons) of programs,
movies, and other programming so that a viewer can watch the
content on his or her own time.45
38. Id.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
41. Id. at 456.
42. Annual Assessment, supra note 8, at 166.
43. Id. at 124-25.
44. Id. at 112-13.
45. Id. at 4, 126.
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HI. Challenges to the Pay-TV Traditional Business Model
Recent events indicate that almost all of the components of the
traditional business model are being challenged legally by new entrants,
and even by incumbents, which creates a great deal of conflict and
uncertainty in the television industry. This part identifies and examines
cases and events that reveal cracks in the structure of the traditional
business model. In particular, challenges are organized according to which
stakeholder of the business model is most directly affected: Cable
programmers, broadcasters, or MVPDs.
A. Challenges to Cable Programmers
Major programmers' bundling practices and other business models
have been subjected to legal attacks and political scrutiny. For example, in
Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., a class action in which cable and satellite
subscribers unsuccessfully challenged the combined bundling practices of
major programmers and MVPDs. 4 6
The plaintiffs modeled the bundling practices of the major
programmers in the form of a tying agreement; the tying product being the
high demand networks and the tied product being the low-demand
networks.4 7 Under the tying agreement video distributors and thus
consumers are forced to purchase a much larger set of networks instead of
just those that they actually have a willingness to pay for, if given the
option.4 8  Programmers often have the leverage to insist that even low-
demand networks be placed on the most commonly purchased tier.4 9 It is
estimated, using data based on the Canadian experience where consumers
have a greater ability to choose networks on an t la carte basis, that "the
total welfare losses from forced bundling are likely to be in the range from
$28 billion to $41 billion annually."50 The plaintiffs argued that all major
programmers (those controlling access to programming networks with the
46. 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir.2012).
47. Id. at 1200.
48. Id.
49. One economic reason for why a video programmer ties low-demand to high-demand
networks is to capture consumer surplus by means of price discrimination. "Employing a devise
known as inter-product price discrimination, programmers group together a bundle of channels
knowing that, given diverse preferences, there will likely be at least one channel in the bundle to
which a consumer will have intense loyalty and a corresponding willingness to pay a high price."
See Warren S. Grimes, The Distribution of Pay Television in the United States: Let an
Unshackled Marketplace Decide, 5 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 7 (2014).
50. Id. at 42. According to Professor Grimes, specific components of overall welfare losses
arising from forced bundling were attributable to the following factors: (a) A wealth transfer
injury since consumers paid supracompetitive prices for television; (b) an output reduction since
some consumers did not subscribe given the supracompetitive prices; (c) a reduction in consumer
choice; and (d) a reduction in competition among video distributors. Id.
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greatest demand) made use of tying arrangements revealing a pattern of
parallel conduct that video distributors and consumers could not escape.5'
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the antitrust complaint on grounds that a
tying complaint under section I of the Sherman Act must allege that the
tying practice foreclosed upstream independent programmers from the tied
market in order to demonstrate injury to competition (and not merely injury
to consumers).52 The plaintiffs did not, nor felt it necessary to, make such
an allegation.5 3  The court disagreed and framed the complaint as solely
about consumers being forced to pay higher prices to purchase cable
networks that they would have preferred not to purchase.54 According to
the court, this, by itself, was not an injury to competition.55
A second legal case brought by a cable MVPD involving the bundling
practices of a major video programmer-Cablevision Systems Corp. v.
Viacom International Inc.-is now underway and stands a better chance of
disrupting the practice of forced bundling.56  Since the Cablevision
complaint against Viacom does include an upstream foreclosure allegation,
it holds the potential to restructure the marketing model for a programmer's
cable networks. Cablevision argues that the goal of a video distributor is
to offer subscribers a set of networks through use of a tiering structure that
makes the product offerings as attractive as possible. A MVPD's creation
of tiers/packages is subject to constraints such as: Tiering requirements
imposed by programmers; limitations on the bandwidth available for video
programming; regulatory requirements such as must-carry obligations;
financial limitations of the specific video distributor; and competitive
factors, such as the need to provide commercially critical networks, to be
seen as a viable option in the eyes of pay-TV customers.o
51. Brantley, 675 F.3d at 1200.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1203-04.
55. Id.; see also Joseph Adamson, Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Cable-and-Satellite-
TV Channel Bundling Case, ANTITRUST UPDATE (May 31, 2012), http://antitrust.weil.com/
articles/ninth-circuit-affirms-dismissal-of-cable-and-satellite-tv-channel-bundling-case.
56. Cablevision Complaint, supra note 24.
57. Id.
5 8. Id.
59. According to Cablevision, core networks are a necessary (must-have) component of
their video product offerings since if they were not included, "a substantial number of subscribers
would likely abandon [or refuse to consider] Cablevision and instead chose to receive video
services from one of Cablevision's numerous competitors." Id. Examples of commercially
critical networks include ESPN, the four major broadcast networks, and the Discovery network.
Cablevision Complaint, supra note 24. According to Cablevision, suite networks do not possess
this must-have characteristic. Id.
60. Id.
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Tying low-demand networks to high-demand networks prevents any
video distributor from carrying other networks that would better match its
subscribers' preferences, and enables the distributor to differentiate its
product offerings, make better use of scarce programming dollars, and
better utilize limited bandwidth.6' However, Cablevision argues that other
MVPDs are subject to the same forced bundling practice from Viacom as
they confront.6 2 From an antitrust law perspective, eliminating forced
bundling would lower barriers to entry for independent networks that
compete with the low-demand networks (the tied product) for money and
space on an MVPD system. Viacom counters by arguing that it does
make the core networks available to Cablevision as a distinct product.64
Cablevision rebuts this point by saying that it would face a ten-figure
penalty to carry just the core networks, compared to what they would pay
for the bundle of core and suite networks.6 5  Thus, in the view of
Cablevision, Viacom's proposal to provide access to only the core
networks is economically nonsensical.
Compared to Brantley, this complaint has a better chance of succeeding
on its legal merits for two reasons. First, the complaint alleges upstream
foreclosure of independent networks from needed modes of distribution,
which creates a barrier to entry. This directly addresses the Ninth Circuit's
criticism of the omission of a foreclosure claim, and thus an injury to
competition in Brantley. Second, the lawsuit is more targeted than
Brantley, which included multiple programmers and video distributors as
defendants; Cablevision has narrowed the focus to claims against one
major programmer by one major MVPD.67
Political pressure is also being applied to require programmers to offer
the networks it owns to distributors on an A la carte basis, as well as in
packages. Senator John McCain introduced bill S.912, the Television
Consumer Freedom Act of 2013, which is aimed at undoing forced
bundling by programmers, among other things. 8 Part of the impetus for
the bill is a recent FCC pricing survey that compared the increase in the
price of the expanded basic cable tier to the increase in the Consumer Price
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2012).
68. Dan Nowicki, McCain Bill Would Create 'A La Carte' Cable Pricing, USA TODAY
(May 20, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/05/20/mcca
in-revives-a-la-carte-cable-bill/2325953/.
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Index ("CPI") from 1995 to 201 1.69 During that time, the price of
expanded basic packages increased at a compound annual rate of 6.1%
compared to 2.4% for the CPI. 70 It appears that Senator McCain believes
that one reason cable prices are increasing at three times the rate of
inflation is the ability of major programmers to offer pay-TV subscribers
the option to purchase networks as bloated, highly priced bundles, rather
than offering the option to purchase networks on an A la carte basis.
B. Challenges to Broadcasters
Broadcasters are facing technological and legal challenges to their
standard way of conducting business on two fronts, each representing a
major area of revenue generation. First, the most rapidly growing source of
revenue, retransmission fees, is under assault in the high-profile lawsuit,
American Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.. 71 A second threat to a
component of the broadcasters' business model, revenue generation from
advertisements, presented itself in the Ninth Circuit case Fox Broadcasting
Co., in which the court confirmed the legitimacy of technology designed to
allow viewers to skip the ads bundled with a network's programming.72
1. Restransmission Fees
First, a brief primer on broadcasting technology and case law pertinent to
Aereo's entry into video distribution is presented. The delivery of television
programming began when the federal government granted television
broadcasters the right to use a slice of the electromagnetic spectrum without
charge. With this license television broadcasters were able to broadcast a
signal encompassing video programming to a given geographic area.74 In
turn, the signal can be captured by an antenna on the rooftop of a home in the
region, and transmitted to a television set within the home for free.75 This
69. Report on Cable Industry Prices, FCC DA 12-377 (2012), available at http://hraunfo
ss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-12-377A1.pdf [hereinafter Cable Report].
70. S. Derek Turner, Combating the Cable Cabal: How to Fix America's Broken Video
Market, FREE PRESS (May 2013), available at http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/
resources/CombatingTheCableCabal 0.pdf. It is a common rebuttal for programmers to
explain that price increases reflect, in part, the increasing number of networks viewers have to
choose from (typically over one hundred cable networks available in the expanded basic tier)
while failing to mention that the average number of networks actually viewed is a small
percentage of the networks supplied. Id.
71. WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).
72. Fox Bmad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network LLC, No. 12-57048 WL 260572 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2014).
73. Annual Assessment, supra note 9, at 83.
74. Id.
75. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 693.
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can be done because such a performance of the broadcaster's signal is
considered a private performance under copyright law.76
In the 1950s, cable operators first entered the video distribution
business by erecting a community antenna and capturing local broadcast
signals.77 After constructing a physical network in a community, the cable
operator was able to distribute all local broadcast signals to any home in the
region that purchased a cable subscription. 8 The cable operator's
distribution of the programming from a broadcast network is considered to
be a public performance for which the cable operator may have to pay the
broadcaster for the right to carry the broadcaster's signal.7 9  Such a
payment is called a retransmission fee.8 o It represents the fee that the
broadcaster receives from the cable operator for the public performance of
the broadcaster's signal by the cable operator.8 '
Aereo, which launched February 2002 in New York City, can be
viewed as an antenna rental technology service, designed to capitalize on
the private performance exemption contained in copyright law, rather than
operate as a video distribution service.82 As a result, the OVD is not
obligated to pay local broadcasters for the transmission of broadcast
signals. Aereo captures the over-the-air signals of broadcasters operating
in a given region using a pool of centralized multiple mini-antennas, each
assigned to a specific customer.84 For a monthly fee (under $15), the local
signals are then streamed live to the customer's residence over the Internet,
and can be viewed on any of the customer's internet-enabled devices.
Aereo argues that it is facilitating a customary practice for its
customers to do what they have always been allowed to do legally, which is
76. A recent report put the percentage of households who watch TV with their own antenna
at 7%. Press Release, Consumer Elecs. Ass'n, Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on
Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study (July 30, 2013), http://www.ce.org/News/News-
Releases/Press-Releases/2013-Press-Releases/Only-Seven-Percent-of-TV-Households-Rely-On-
Over-t.aspx.
77. Evolution of Cable Television, FCC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http//www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/
evolution-cable-television.
78. Id.
79. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, P. L. No. 102-385,
106 Stat. 1460 (1992) ("Cable Act"). If a local broadcaster elects to utilize the must-carry option,
the cable operator does not have to pay for the right to distribute the signal. Id.
80. Annual Assessment, supra note 9, at 104.
81. Id.
82. A copyright owner possesses the right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly." 17
U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
83. WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 692-93 (2d Cir. 2013).
84. Julianne Pepitone and Brian Stelter, Supreme Court to Hear Broadcasters' Case Against
Aereo, CNN MONEY (Jan. 10, 2014, 4:33 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/10/technology/aereo-
supreme-court/.
85. Id.
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to use a dedicated antenna to view over-the-air local broadcast signals for
free.86 Broadcasters quickly responded to this new form of competition
(which they have labeled as stealing) and sued Aereo in several
jurisdictions (New York, Massachusetts, and Utah) for infringement of the
broadcasters' copyright-protected public performance rights.
To the broadcasters' dismay, in April 2013, the Second Circuit88
upheld a denial of a preliminary injunction motion against Aereo by
broadcasters in the Southern District of New York. 89 Based on petitions for
certiorari from both sides, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.90 If
Aereo is found to provide a legal service, the business model of
broadcasters is ripe to be fundamentally altered.
There have been very interesting reactions by broadcasters and
distributors to Aereo's early legal successes in fighting the preliminary
injunctions. On one hand, Fox and CBS have threatened to convert their
broadcast networks into pay cable networks to try and replace the loss of
retransmission income if Aereo's business model is found legal. 91 Less
dramatically, broadcasters could move some of their most valuable content,
such as live sporting events, to pay cable networks. Major sports leagues,
such as Major League Baseball and the National Football League, are
supporting the broadcasters' case, and have threatened to sell the rights to
their games in the future only to cable networks (i.e., no more Super Bowl
aired on a broadcast network).92
On the other hand, some MVPDs are looking to incorporate the Aereo
model into their way of conducting business to escape both the need to pay
retransmission fees and to suffer through increasingly occurring
86. Id.
87. Mike Masnick, Aereo Wins Yet Another Ruling Over TV Networks, TECHDIRT (Oct. 10,
2013, 12:51 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articies/20131010/09402924825/aereo-wins-yet-another-
ruling-over-tv-networks.shtml.
88. WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2013).
89. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Natalie Kim,
Second Circuit Affirms Streaming Broadcast Not Copyright Infringement, JOLT DIGEST, (Apr. 10,
2013), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/copyright/second-circuit-affirms-streaming-broadcast-tv-
not-copyright-infringement.
90. Adam Liptak & Bill Carter, Justices Take Case on Free TV Streaming, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/medialsupreme-court-to-hear-case-on-
retransmission-of-tv-signals-by-aereo.html?_r-0.
91. Mike Masnick, Hilarious And Ridiculous: Networks Threaten to Pull Channels Off the
Air IfAereo & Dish Win Lawsuits, TECHDIRT (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/2
0130408/12161722625/hilarious-ridiculous-networks-threaten-to-pull-channels-off-air-if-aereo-win-
lawsuits.shtml.
92. Sam Gustin, Aereo Supreme Court Challenge Could End Free TV Sports, TIME (Nov.
18, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/11/18/nfl-nba-warn-of-end-of-free-sports-on-television/
#ixzz2lOihQLK6.
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retransmission blackouts. Perhaps most significantly, the resolution of
the case could have far wider implications than defining what the word
"public" means, and who is required to make retransmission payments,
since it involves using the Internet to access content which is the basis of a
growing number of cloud-based storage businesses.
2. Advertising Revenue
In 2014, the Ninth Circuit allowed Dish Network to continue to market
the Hopper, a centrally housed device that allows viewers to automatically
skip commercials.94 The decision was rooted in the fair use standard, as was
the Supreme Court's 1984 Betamax decision.95 This is but another example
of a pattern emerging in which technological changes and legal decisions
disrupt the traditional business model, allowing viewers to have increasing
control as to when, where, how, and on what device they choose to enjoy
video programming. Not surprisingly, broadcasters' displeasure with Dish's
win has caused programmers to engage in hardball tactics in negotiations
with the satellite video distributor over a new programming rights contract.96
In particular, two predictable stumbling blocks to contract negotiations are
the Hopper technology and digital rights to programming.97
C. Challenges to MVPDs
This section demonstrates that governmental regulations have the
potential to determine, to a large extent, the ability of new entrants and
existing players in an industry to be assured of access to a vital input, such
as video programming. Regulations in two areas, one focused on OVDs
and the second on any video distributor, promise to enhance competition in
the distribution of video programming. First, MVPDs face new
competitive challenges to their traditional dominance in video distribution
from two types of OVD competition. One type involves the development
93. Cable Aereo Emulation Complicated, Analyst Say, TV TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.tvtechnology.com/prntarticle.aspx?articleid=222049.
94. Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network LLC, 2014 WL 260572, at *10 (2014).
95. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
96. For example, see Brian Stelter, Disney and Dish Wrangle Not over Broadcast Fees, but
the Future of TV, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/l1/04/business/
medialdisney-and-dish/wrangle-not-over-broadcast-fees-but-over-the-future-of-tv.
97. In the era of broadband technology capable of transporting video signals, contract
negotiations between network owners and video distributors involve many dimensions, including
rights to deliver programming (a) in the traditional linear manner, (b) in the form of on-demand
access to programming, (c) as mobile access to programming, and (d) as viewing opportunities
utilizing online platforms on many devices. See CHARLES B. GOLDFARB & KATHLEEN ANN
RUANE, ONLINE VIDEO DISTRIBUTORS AND THE CURRENT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 16 (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.law.umaryland.edul
marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/R42722_09112012.pdf.
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of OVDs that utilize a similar structural model (i.e., linear prescheduled
channels of programming) to the dominant form used by MVPDs. The
second type involves the growth of OVDs that use an on-demand model for
video distribution, such as Netflix, Amazon, and Apple. There is the
possibility of multiple benefits from online competition, such as more
choice in the selection of video programming as dictated by consumer
demand, more wired and wireless devices capable of displaying video
programming, the promise of further technological change in creation of
video programming, the distribution of video programming, and intense
price competition.98 The regulatory structure that has been created to
govern business relationships in the television industry did not contemplate
the ability to deliver video content, increasingly at higher speeds improving
the quality of viewing, over the Internet. In addition, changes in consumer
demand for video programming from linear to on-demand viewing also
provides a need to amend the prevailing regulatory framework.
The FCC is faced with the challenge of how to incorporate the new
types of Internet-based competition into its regulatory framework. One
opportunity for the FCC to increase video distribution competition centers
on a program access complaint filed in March 2010 by an OVD upstart
called Sky Angel.99 Sky Angel offers an MVPD-like subscription-based
service, which includes a package of cable networks, such as MLB
Network, Hallmark Channel, and the Weather Channel. 00 Its mission is to
be a video distributor of faith-based, family-friendly programming.o' A
subscriber to Sky Angel's service uses his or her own broadband Internet
connection to receive the video content offered by Sky Angel.102 Thus, Sky
Angel is only the distributor of the video programming and not a vertically
integrated MVPD that bundles content distribution and transmission. The
ability to unbundle content from transmission is a result of technological
innovations in digital and broadband technologies.
Sky Angel's complaint alleges that Discovery, a major programmer,
engaged in discriminatory conduct by denying access to several networks
(including Animal Planet and Discovery) that it judges to be critical to its
competitive viability as an online video distributor.10 3 The FCC issued a
Public Notice in March 2012 to address issues implicated in the dispute,
98. Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 417.
99. See Program Access Complaint, Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Comm'ns LLC, 27
FCC Rcd. 3081 (2012), http://digital.1ibrary.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadclO2306/ml/312/ [hereinafter
Sky Angel Complaint].
100. Id.
101. Home Page, Sky Angel, http://www.skyangel.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
102. Sky Angel Complaint, supra note 100.
103. Id.
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centering on how to classify OVDs.104 In order to have legal access to the
FCC's program access complaint process, the complainant must be classified
as an MVPD. 05 One key issue for the FCC is to determine if, in order to be
classified as an MVPD, an OVD must provide the two elements that a
traditional MVPD provides: (1) The physical connection/transmission path,
and (2) the video content that is distributed.10 6 Sky Angel only provides the
second element whereas traditional MVPDs provide both elements. 07
While this may seem to be a simple question, in reality, the FCC must
incorporate into its analysis statutory language and previous regulatory
decisions written in the context of the existing technology of the day, and
not in terms of what is possible today. Two different functions are
involved: Content provider (i.e., a video distributor) and transmission
provider.'08 Until the development of the Internet, in the case of video,
these two functions were provided by the same vertically integrated
company.109 In order to facilitate competition in video distribution, it
should be recognized that the two services are distinct and no longer
inextricably intertwined. Whatever the decision the FCC makes will
determine, to a large extent, the fate of OVDs that utilize the linear
programming model of MVPDs. Legal scholars differ on whether it is a
good idea to classify OVDs that are similar to Sky Angel as OVDs. 0
The FCC directly addressed issues involving OVD access to video
programming in the Comcast-NBCU merger conditions."' The vertical
merger involved Comcast, the nation's leading MVPD and Internet Service
Provider, and NBC Universal, one of the big six video programmers.12 In
the approval of the merger, the FCC established new ground rules (lasting
104. Id.; see also Public Notice, Media Bureau Seeks Comment on Interpretation of the
Terms "Multichannel Video Programming Distributor" and "Channel" as Raised in Pending
Program Access Complaint Proceeding, 27 FCC Rcd. 3079 (2012).
105. Sky Angel Complaint, supra note 100.
106. Id. at 3081-82; see also Media Bureau Seeks Comment, 27 FCC Rcd. 3079 (2012); see
also GOLDFARB & RUANE, supra note 98.
107. Sky Angel Complaint, supra note 100, at 3081.
108. Media Bureau Seeks Comment, 27 FCC Rcd. 3079 (2012).
109. Id.
110. For example, on one hand, it is argued that "[tihe FCC should classify OVDs that
provide multiple scheduled channels of video programming as MVPDs." Note, Enabling
Television Competition in a Converged Market, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2083, 2098 (2013). On the
other hand, it is argued that "[t]he FCC should uphold the Media Bureau's decision [denying
MVPD classification] in the Sky Angel complaint regarding the definition of 'MVPD."' Seth
Cooper, Keep Online Video Free from FCC Regulation, 7 PERSPECTIVES FROM FSF SCHOLARS
1, 4 (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/KeepOnline
VideoFreefromFCCRegulation_091412.pdf.
111. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co.
and NBC Universal, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 2197 (2011) [hereinafter Comcast Merger Order].
112. Id.
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up to seven years) for treatment of OVDs that surpass, in terms of
obligations on the part of Comcast, the program access rules that had
governed a vertically integrated cable operator's conduct toward
unaffiliated video distributors.' The conditions agreed to by Comcast
also demonstrate how the FCC can use its merger authority to impose
obligations that go beyond those attainable in a general rulemaking.114
Effectively, OVDs achieved the status of equals to MVPDs in their ability
to access Comcast's programming.
The FCC concluded in the Comcast Merger Order that the joint venture
between Comcast and NBCU has the incentive and ability to engage in
anticompetitive acts against OVDs."'5  This was more than a merely
theoretical conjecture since the FCC discovered evidence that Comcast
considered the threat of OVDs to be real.1 6 For instance, the FCC states that
"[t]he record here is replete with e-mails from Comcast executives and
internal Comcast documents showing that Comcast believes that OVDs pose
a potential threat to its businesses, that Comcast is concerned about this
potential threat, and that Comcast makes investments in reaction to it." 17
To counter the possibility of discriminatory conduct, two targeted
conditions on the joint venture's conduct as a programmer toward OVDs were
enacted. First, the FCC required that Comcast-NBCU "offer its video
programming to any requesting OVD on the same terms and conditions that
would be available to a traditional MVPD."" This requirement would
typically involve a linear, prescheduled delivery of programming along the
lines utilized by Sky Angel.' 19 The linear model is likely to be less frequently
used by OVDs than the on-demand model, which has developed and evolved
in response to changes in consumer demand for viewing video content.
A second merger condition is based on the principle that the joint
venture should behave toward video distributors in a similar manner to a
113. Id.
114. An unfavorable perspective on this use of FCC merger authority argues that, "[t]he
Commission's Comcast-NBCU order represents an unprecedented regulatory shakedown of a
company that obviously would have done just about anything to gain approval of the deal."
Adam Thierer, Comcast-NBC & the FCC's Unprecedented Merger Shakedown, TECH.
LIBERATION FRONT (Jan. 20, 2011), http://techliberation.com/2011/01/20/comcast-nbc-the-fccs-
unprecedenterd-merger-shakedown.
115. Comcast Merger Order, supra note 112.
116. Id.
117. Id. One example of Comcast's reaction to the threat of OVD competition is the creation
of its own OVD, called "TV Everywhere," in which it provides online access to many of the
networks it offers with its MVPD service but only if the subscriber has a pay-TV subscription. In
short, Comcast and other MVPDs tie access to online video programming to a pay-TV
subscription. See also, Ammori, supra note 3, at 20.
118. Comcast Merger Order, supra note 112.
119. Id.
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leading programmer who operates on a stand-alone basis. The influence of
Comcast as a video distributor is then taken out of the equation for how
content agreements are negotiated. The FCC states that, "[s]pecifically,
once an OVD has entered into an arrangement to distribute programming
from one or more Comcast-NBCU peers, we require Comcast-NBCU to
make comparable programming available to that OVD on economically
comparable terms.',120 This kind of programming is demonstrated by how
an on-demand OVD (such as Netflix, Apple,and Amazon) would like
access to satisfy changing consumer demand. Specifically:
[I]f an OVD receives each episode of five primetime television series
from CBS for display in a subscription VOD [Video on Demand]
service within forty-eight hours of the original airing, the [Joint
Venture] must provide the OVD a comparable set of NBC broadcast
television programs, as measured by volume and economic value, for
display during the same subscription VOD window. 121
As consumers demonstrate an increasing preference for on-demand
access to original and rerun programming, this condition holds the promise
of facilitating the economic viability of on-demand OVDs. In addition, these
merger conditions could serve as the standard for addressing programming
access in future mergers involving vertically integrated media companies.
Another area of regulation addresses circumstances in which a
vertically integrated cable operator possesses the incentive and ability to
engage in anticompetitive conduct against rival distributors through the use
of exclusive contracts. A specific source of continuing concern is
competitors' access to RSNs. Exclusive contracts between video
programmers and video distributors can have procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects. Because of the need to balance the benefits with
the costs of exclusivity, the FCC substituted the ban on exclusive contracts
with a case-by-case analysis of the legality of an exclusive contract
between a cable operator and a cable-affiliated programmer; thus, the FCC
allowed the sunset of the previous ban, as established in the Cable Act of
1992 on exclusive contracts covering all cable-affiliated programming.122
The change from a ban to a case-by-case consideration of exclusive
120. Id.
121. See Competitive Impact Statement, Department of Justice, SECTION HI.A.1. (Jan. 18,
2011). http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.htn. Programming peers include Viacom,
News Corporation, Time Warner, Inc., Sony Corporation of America, The Walt Disney Company,
and CBS. Id.
122. In re Revision of the Comm'n's Program Access Rules, 27 FCC Rcd. 12605 (2012)
[hereinafter Revision].
contracts shifted the burden of proof from cable operators to competitors in
programming access disputes.
Although cable market power at the national level is diminishing, there
remains a continuing concern about cable market power in individual
geographic markets where cable operators have clustered their systems.1 23
Cable operators (such as Comcast, Time Warner, Cablevision, and Cox)
frequently control RSNs that are viewed as must-have programming which
can have a significant effect on local video distribution competition. The
distinguishing characteristics of such regional sports programming are (1)
non-replicable and (2) critically important to consumers. 124  Thus, for a
vertically-integrated cable operator, the combination of a dominant regional
market share, and control of must-have programming, facilitates the
exercise of market power using exclusive contracts.125
In order to lessen the burden of proof on complainants in the case of
access to programming from RSNs, the FCC has made or proposed
procedural assumptions in the case-by-case complaint process. The goals
of these assumptions are to make it somewhat easier for video distribution
rivals to gain access to such programming.
Consider the case of a cable operator that enters into an exclusive
contract with a cable-affiliated RSN but a rival video distributor desires
access to the programming of the RSN, no doubt in light of its must-have
nature and its critical importance to consumers' subscription decisions.12 6
The rival files a complaint about the exclusive contract alleging a violation
of section 628(b) of the Cable Act.127 The complainant bears the burden of
proof to establish that the contract at issue possesses two elements: (1) The
contract is "unfair" based on the facts and circumstances presented; and (2)
123. For instance, the FCC observed that "[i]n the 2007 Extension Order, the Commission
noted that Comcast passed more than 70[%] of television households in 30 Designated Market
Areas ("DMAs") and TWC passed more than 70[%] of television households in (twenty-three]
DMAs." These figures cannot be compared to the equivalent findings in the 2012 order since the
2011 data was redacted, but a theme of the order indicated an increase in the amount of regional
concentration of vertically integrated cable providers. Id.
124. Revision, supra note 123, at 12642-43.
125. In addition to the theoretical incentive and ability concerns, vertically integrated cable
operators have acted in the past on anticompetitive incentives to inhibit video distribution rivals.
Specifically, the FCC presented statistical evidence of the use of exclusive contracts between
vertically integrated cable operators and terrestrially delivered RSNs that have harmed
distribution competitors in certain cities/regions. Id.
126. When Google Fiber entered the broadband access market in Kansas City and decided to
offer television service, it experienced difficulty in gaining access to Time Warner Cable's RSN.
See Karl Bode, Incumbents Blocking Google Fiber Access to Sports Channels? DSL REPORTS
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Incumbents-Blocking-Google-Fiber-
Access-to-Sports-Channels-121370.
127. Revision, supra note 123, at 12639-40.
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the contract has the "purpose or effect" of "significantly hindering or
preventing" the complainant from competing.12 8
The FCC has established or proposes to establish a rebuttable
presumption for each element in the complaint process that incrementally
makes it easier for the complainant to prevail in such cases. The FCC has
established a rebuttable presumption that an exclusive contract between a
cable operator and a cable-affiliated RSN satisfies element (2). 129 For
element (1), the FCC proposes to establish a similar rebuttable
presumption.13 0 Use of presumptions is likely to slightly tip the scales of
justice to the side of opening access to must-have programming in regional
markets where cable operators possess significant market power.
IV. Conclusion
This is an exciting time for the television industry. Viewers enjoy
increased freedom to decide when, where, how, and on which device to
watch television programming. New programmers and video distributors are
discovering profitable niches in the industry. However, the traditional
business model for the industry in which major programmers bundle multiple
cable and broadcast networks together, generating large licensing and
retransmission consent fees, which, in turn, are passed on to viewers through
their cable, satellite, or telephone MVPD, is becoming unsustainable.
Technological changes have made it economically and technically feasible to
be a stand-alone video distributor without ownership of the underlying
transmission network that transmits the video programming. Online video
distributors offer a real competitive threat to incumbents for linear and on-
demand programming and are gaining interest and dollars from viewers.
Across the industry, the demand for access to unbundled video programming
is growing. Access to video programming or access in the format (i.e.,
online) that a viewer chooses is in high demand. This demand is evident by
an increasing number of legal, technological, economic, and political
challenges to the traditional business model of the television industry. Many
incumbents in the industry will fight disruption to the traditional ways of
doing business. They may be successful in slowing down the evolution of a
new business model but change is inevitable.
128. Revision, supra note 123.
129. Id. In 2010, the presumption was established for terrestrially-delivered RSNs and in
2012, it applies regardless of what technology is used to deliver the programming.
130. Id. The FCC has also requested comments on several other issues that could make access
to sports programming at the regional and national levels easier for video distribution competitors.
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